In seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein: Toward a Recuperation of Hegel’s Metaphysics of Agency by Roy, Ayon
© 2006. Epoché, Volume 11, Issue 1 (Fall 2006). ISSN 1085-1968. 225–255
In seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein: 
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ABSTRACT: This essay argues for a distinctly post-Kantian understanding of 
Hegel’s defi nition of freedom as “being at home with oneself in one’s other.” 
I fi rst briefl y isolate the inadequacies of some dominant interpretations 
of Hegelian freedom and proceed to develop a more adequate theoretical 
frame by turning to Theodor Adorno. Then I interpret Hegel’s notion of 
the freedom of the will in the Philosophy of Right in terms of his speculative 
metaphysics. Finally, I briefl y examine Hegel’s treatment of agency in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit in order to establish important continuities between 
the early and late Hegel.
The specter of the divided Kantian subject—more, perhaps, than that of the Cartesian subject, as Slavoj Žižek would have it—haunts 
Western academia.1 It would be no exaggeration to assert that the radical 
split established so forcefully by Kant between the noumenal self precari-
ously dwelling in the ethical realm of freedom and the phenomenal self 
hopelessly trapped in the causal realm of necessity, provides the basic 
coordinates for discourse on agency to this day. The early twentieth-
century spectrum of thought on agency simply transposed this Kantian 
dichotomy into the extremes of Sartrean existentialism’s absolute free-
dom of choice and vulgar Marxism’s reduction of the subject’s so-called 
“freedom of choice” to a superstructural refl ex.2 The spectrum requires 
little updating, it seems, to make it relevant to contemporary discourse. 
One need only replace vulgar Marxism with certain strains of poststruc-
turalism, which reduce the robust subject to a mere “subject-effect” of 
226 Ayon Roy
the discursive-ideological fi eld.3 And as for the defunct Sartrean subject’s 
existential freedom, it now appears in the guise of the liberal bourgeois 
subject’s pretense to “freedom of choice” under late capitalism.4
It is something of an irony, then, that Hegel has been so eagerly as-
similated to either extreme of the spectrum—as if he had not been the 
most powerful champion of the need to overcome the very terms of the 
antithesis in the fi rst place.5 It seems easy enough to rehearse Hegel’s 
decisive response to Kant. If the Kantian autonomous subject remains 
continually haunted by its heteronomous Other, the Hegelian subject 
earns genuine autonomy only by incorporating or, in proper Hegelese, 
sublating the Other within it. As Hegel puts it in a well-known for-
mulation from the Encyclopaedia Logic, freedom consists in “being at 
home with oneself in one’s other, depending upon oneself, and being 
one’s own determinant” (in seinem Anderen bei sich selbst zu sein, von 
sich abzuhängen, das Bestimmende seiner selbst zu sein).6 However, as 
the formidable scholarship on Hegel attests, it is all too easy to be glib 
about the Hegelian subject’s “sublation of otherness” and much more 
diffi cult to articulate what such sublation concretely involves. This essay 
is a modest attempt at such an articulation.
Proceeding from the conviction that Hegel’s major works can mutu-
ally illuminate one another, I test the possibility that the metaphysics of 
the will which Hegel develops in the Introduction to his last published 
work, Philosophy of Right (1821), can help us to appreciate Hegel’s con-
ception of agency in the much earlier Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 
Of course, I fully realize that conceiving his corpus as a more or less 
unifi ed body of thought fl ies in the face of most scholarship on Hegelian 
agency, which insists on a fairly radical discontinuity between the “early” 
and “late” Hegel. Hegel commentators in the Anglo-American analytic 
tradition are especially insistent on this discontinuity, almost exclusively 
focusing on the late Philosophy of Right, which supposedly contains his 
“mature” views on agency. So although it might seem anachronistic to 
read the Phenomenology in light of the Philosophy of Right, I risk such 
a synthetic account of Hegelian agency on the conviction that we can 
appreciate what is uniquely valuable in the Phenomenology’s complex 
account of agency by reading it against the later Hegel’s speculative 
metaphysics of the will (and vice-versa).
All this by way of anticipation. However, before turning to a close 
examination of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right and the 
Phenomenology, I need to develop an adequate theoretical frame within 
which to examine Hegelian agency. To this end, I proceed contrastively; 
that is, the inadequacies of some common approaches to Hegelian 
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agency will help cumulatively to motivate a viable theoretical frame. 
I begin by considering some exemplary Anglo-American “liberal” ac-
counts of Hegelian agency which either ignore or severely downplay 
Hegel’s speculative metaphysics. I then turn to Žižek’s interpretation 
of Hegelian agency in order to expose the basic failings of the Anglo-
American approach. Žižek, I hope to show, is brilliant in registering the 
inadequacies of liberal “freedom of choice” readings of Hegelian agency. 
However, Žižek’s Lacanian reading of Hegelian agency comes perilously 
close to the poststructuralist stance which Žižek explicitly rejects: in the 
end, he seems to deprive the Hegelian subject of all substantiality. So 
I turn to the work of Theodor Adorno which, I argue, honors Hegel’s 
speculative metaphysics without eviscerating the Hegelian subject. With 
this Adornian frame in place, we can turn to Hegel’s metaphysics of 
the will, elaborated in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, and 
fi nally, to the Phenomenology.
I. Hegel as Rawlsian Liberal?
Allen Wood opens his book, Hegel’s Ethical Thought, with a polemical 
attack on those commentators who attempt to link Hegel’s speculative 
metaphysics to his political philosophy: “If you are not so sensible, you 
will humbug yourself into thinking that there is some esoteric truth 
in Hegelian dialectical logic which provides a hidden key to his social 
thought.”7 Instead, Wood claims to provide a sober account of Hegelian 
ethics based on the Philosophy of Right, explicitly reading Hegel “against 
his own self-understanding”—that is, ignoring Hegel’s own repeated 
protestations that his political philosophy can only be understood in 
light of his speculative metaphysics. Let us see how Wood handles Hegel’s 
key notion of freedom:
“Being with oneself in an other” is a paradox. It speaks of something 
that is different from or other than myself and yet at the same time 
not different or other at all, because I am “with myself” in it. The 
central paradoxes in Hegel’s philosophy need not scandalize us once 
their point is properly understood (and we do not need a new system 
of “dialectical logic” in order to understand them). . . . Freedom for 
Hegel is a relational property. It involves a self, an object . . . and a 
rational project of the self. Any object, simply as object, is an “other” 
to the self whose object it is. But because a self is actual by identifying 
itself with a set of rational projects involving objects, the otherness 
of an object can be overcome when the object is integrated into the 
self ’s rational projects. A self is with itself or free in an object with 
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respect to a rational project if that object belongs to that project, 
becoming a part of that self.8
Wood’s purportedly non-metaphysical reading of the “paradoxical” 
Hegelian formulation, “being with oneself in an other,” turns out to 
involve something resembling the Rawlsian deontological subject freely 
choosing its determinations. But the avowedly non-metaphysical status 
of Wood’s interpretation should give us pause. After all, if Michael Sandel 
powerfully demonstrates how something like a Kantian transcendental 
subject underlies Rawls’s political theory, it is hard to see how Wood’s 
account of the self ’s overcoming of otherness through its incorporation 
into a “rational project” can escape this charge of a tacit—and deeply 
problematic—metaphysics.9 But we do not need Sandel to prove this; in 
my later reading of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, I argue 
that Hegel himself radically critiques the underlying metaphysics of a 
liberal bourgeois conception of “freedom of choice” based on “ratio-
nal projects.”10 The paradox of “being with oneself in an other” is easy 
enough to handle, Wood demonstrates, so long as the complexities of 
Hegel’s own argument are actively suppressed.
Robert Pippin’s treatment of agency in Hegel improves on Wood’s 
account by insisting on the importance of situating Hegel’s ethics within 
his larger philosophical architectonic. Pippin argues that Hegel’s account 
of how Spirit emerges from nature is essential to understanding Hegel’s 
notion of freedom: “Spirit . . . is . . . not the emergence of a non-natural 
substance, but refl ects only the growing capacity of still naturally situated 
beings in achieving more and more successfully a form of normative 
and genuinely autonomous like-mindedness.”11 But it quickly becomes 
apparent that Pippin locates Hegel’s advancement over Kant in Hegel’s 
pragmatization of Kant’s metaphysics of agency—in his insistence on 
the “original, indispensable role of the ethical community”: “in Hegel 
as in Kant, I am subject only to laws that I in some sense author and 
subject myself to. But the legislation of such a law does not consist in 
some paradoxical single moment of election, whereby a noumenal in-
dividual elects as a supreme governing principle, either obedience to the 
moral law as a life policy, or the priority of self-love and its satisfactions. 
The formation of and self-subjection to such normative constraints 
is gradual, collective, and actually historical.”12 Pippin here sets up an 
either-or between Kant’s untenable metaphysics of agency and Hegel’s 
non-metaphysical, historico-pragmatic conception of agency. So Pip-
pin attempts to free Hegelian agency from the kind of problematic 
metaphysics that Allan Wood seems to bind himself to, by relativizing 
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the justifi cation for a given individual’s “rational project” to his or her 
community’s ethical norms.13
But it is hard to tell Pippin’s account of Hegelian agency apart from 
a straightforwardly pragmatic conception. In a telling footnote, Pippin 
acknowledges the obvious affi nities between his treatment of Hegelian 
agency and neo-pragmatism: “The interpretive direction suggested here, 
‘left Hegelian’ as it is, might look like a familiar, and ever more popular, 
one in Anglophone interpretations—a pragmatism, perhaps a radical 
pragmatism. . . . There is, however, something non-negotiable, let’s say, in 
Hegel’s account that makes such interpretations incomplete. Said sum-
marily, the status of freedom in Hegel is ‘absolute’; its historical character 
is only a matter of its ‘realization’” (“Hegel’s Practical Philosophy,” p. 
198). Pippin’s feeble attempt here to distance himself from pragmatism 
rests on an insistence on the “absolute” nature of freedom in Hegel; the 
word “absolute” has to be scare-quoted, though, since it makes little 
sense to conceive this absoluteness outside the realm of Hegel’s specu-
lative metaphysics. The possibility Pippin summarily forecloses—one 
which I will explore in this paper—is that of recuperating a distinctly 
post-Kantian metaphysics of agency from Hegel’s work.
II. The Tautological Gesture: 
Žižek’s Reading of Hegel
Žižek’s reading of Hegelian agency is the crucial fi rst step in such a recu-
peration. In a number of provocative works, Žižek insists on the necessity 
of construing Hegelian agency via his speculative metaphysics.14 In my 
later discussion of the Philosophy of Right, I will examine the details of 
Žižek’s interpretation of Hegelian agency in terms of the doctrine of 
essence elaborated in the Science of Logic. For present purposes, suffi ce 
it for Žižek to illuminate the fundamental problem in wanting a Hegel 
shorn of his metaphysics. The attempt to conceive Hegel’s formulation 
of freedom as “being at home in one’s other” in the non-metaphysical 
terms of incorporating an agent’s ends into his or her “rational project,” 
Žižek argues, is exactly wrong. According to the “philosophical common 
sense” of a Wood or a Pippin, Žižek writes, “we have the possibility of 
choice, we can realize our freely conceived projects, but only within the 
framework of tradition, of the inherited circumstances which delineate 
our fi eld of choices. . . . However, it is precisely such a ‘dialectical synthe-
sis’ that Hegel declines. The whole point of his argument is that we have 
no way of drawing a line between the two aspects.”15 We will examine in 
detail below how what Žižek calls the “vulgar liberal notion of freedom 
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of choice”16 is reduced to a sublated moment in the development of 
robust agency in Hegel’s work.
Problems arise, however, when Žižek tries to extract a positive account 
of agency from Hegel. On Žižek’s Lacanian reading, the Hegelian subject 
seems to be rarefi ed virtually out of existence. If poststructuralism’s 
claim is that there is nothing left over from the process of subjectiva-
tion, Žižek’s claim seems to be that there is precisely nothing left over 
from subjectivation—and this “nothing” is the Hegelian subject. The 
movement from a poststructuralist conception of agency to a Lacanian-
Hegelian one consists in the subtle “conversion of this lack of the signifi er 
into the signifi er of the lack.”17
But what then becomes of the Hegelian subject’s “free will”? For Žižek, 
the subject’s only genuinely “free” act consists in a “purely symbolic, 
tautological gesture,”18 which he aligns with Lacan’s “point de capiton”: 
“one has to renounce thoroughly the standard notion of ‘freedom as 
comprehended necessity.’ . . . Hegel’s point is, on the contrary, that it 
is only the subject’s (free) act of ‘dotting the i’ which retroactively installs 
necessity, so that the very act by means of which the subject recognizes 
(and thus constitutes) necessity is the supreme act of freedom and as 
such the self-suppression of necessity.”19 Unfortunately, Žižek never gets 
any clearer on what this “free,” albeit radically tautological, act concretely 
consists in. Worse, he is unable to fi nd a correlate for Lacan’s point de 
capiton anywhere in Hegel’s texts themselves. So if it took a Lacanian 
perspective on Hegelian agency to discern the need to honor Hegel’s 
speculative metaphysics, the trouble with Žižek’s account is that he so 
Lacanianizes Hegel that nothing is left of Hegel himself.
III. Harnessing the Strength of the Subject: 
Adorno on Hegelian Agency
Adorno proves to be so helpful because he, like Žižek, emphasizes Hegel’s 
speculative metaphysics but, unlike Žižek, does not liquidate the subject 
to a vanishing point (de capiton). Against Wood and Pippin, Adorno 
insists, “Hegel’s substantive insights . . . cannot be separated from specu-
lation—the vulgar notion of which has nothing to do with the Hegelian 
notion—as though it were some kind of troublesome ornamentation. 
On the contrary, those insights are produced by speculation, and they 
lose their substance as soon as they are conceived as merely empiri-
cal.”20 Shortly thereafter, Adorno shrewdly anticipates and passes his 
grim verdict on the Anglo-American analytic approach to Hegel that 
ignores his speculative metaphysics: “If one tried to rescue the material 
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substance of Hegelian philosophy from its allegedly outmoded and 
arbitrary speculation by eradicating its idealism, one would have noth-
ing but positivism on the one hand and superfi cial intellectual history 
on the other.”21 In fact, it is in these speculative concepts summarily 
dismissed by Wood as far-fetched that Adorno locates Hegel’s most 
concrete insights into agency:
[I]t is precisely the construction of the absolute subject in Hegel 
that does justice to an objectivity indissoluble in subjectivity. Para-
doxically, historically, only absolute idealism gives free rein to the 
method that the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit calls 
“simply looking on” [reines Zusehen]. Hegel is able to think from 
the thing itself out, to surrender passively, as it were, to its authentic 
substance, only because by virtue of the system the matter at hand 
is referred to its identity with absolute subject. Things themselves 
speak in a philosophy that focuses its energies on proving that it is 
itself one with them.22
From an Adornian perspective, it is precisely because Wood and Pip-
pin neglect Hegel’s metaphysics that they end up reducing Hegel’s 
conception of agency to a liberal or pragmatic framework. So instead 
of dismissing Hegel’s metaphysics as willfully obscure, we might begin 
to appreciate its complexity as a necessary means of allowing the object 
to develop immanently. It is no wonder that we fi nd Hegel’s metaphys-
ics—in which “things themselves speak”—so profoundly disorienting: 
our disorientation is an index of the extent to which his language refuses 
the assimilation of the object to preconceived frameworks.
For Adorno, Hegel’s conception of the subject carefully negotiates 
between the inadequate extremes of liberal “freedom of choice” ideology 
and poststructuralist-Lacanian eviscerations of the subject. As Adorno 
observes in Negative Dialectics, a work published shortly after his book 
on Hegel, “[t]he individual’s independence, inappropriately stressed by 
liberal ideology, does not prevail.”23 In fact, Adorno locates a trenchant 
critique of liberalism in Hegel himself: “Hegel disdains the illusion of 
freedom, the individual who, in the midst of universal unfreedom, be-
haves as though he were already free and universal.”24
However, Adorno’s critique of liberal ideology does not lead him 
simply to dismiss the category of the subject altogether. In the Preface 
to Negative Dialectics, Adorno famously announces the book’s task: “To 
use the strength of the subject to break through the fallacy of constitutive 
subjectivity.”25 Later in the book, Adorno elaborates this notion: “The 
subject is the lie, because for the sake of its own absolute rule it will 
deny its own objective defi nitions. Only he who would refrain from such 
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lies—who would have used his own strength, which he owes to identity, 
to cast off the façade of identity—would truly be a subject.”26 Here we 
see Adorno struggling to capture the paradox of Hegel’s formulation of 
freedom as “being at home with oneself in one’s other.” The subject, in 
order to earn genuine subjectivity, must acknowledge “its own objective 
defi nitions.” “Freedom,” for Adorno, in this age of nearly thoroughgoing 
ideological interpellation, “is never more than an instant of spontane-
ity.”27 Notice that Adorno, unlike Žižek, does not dismiss the possibility 
of robust freedom altogether; an individual’s freedom is never entirely 
coopted by ideology.
We need Adorno, I think, to appreciate fully Hegel’s fundamental 
refusal to be assimilated to the extremes of liberal or poststructuralist-
Lacanian conceptions of agency, which give a straightforward “Yes” or 
“No” to the question of freedom. In the readings of the Philosophy of 
Right and the Phenomenology that follow, we would do well to heed 
Adorno’s strictures for theory to engage in a dialectic of the individual 
and its circumstances:
The question of freedom does not call for a Yes or No; it calls for 
theory to rise above the individuality that exists as well as above the 
society that exists. Instead of sanctioning the internalized and hard-
ened authority of the super-ego, theory should carry out the dialectics 
of individual and species. . . . The subject would be liberated only as 
an I reconciled with the not-I.28
IV. Hegel’s Metaphysics of the Will in 
the Philosophy of Right
There is admittedly a certain irony in adopting an Adornian frame in 
our reading of the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right. Adorno, after 
all, repeatedly condemns the Philosophy of Right as, by and large, a piece 
of non-dialectical and non-speculative “pedantry.”29 I suggest, however, 
that the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right is often reduced to non-
speculative “pedantry” at the hands of a Wood or Pippin, so we ought 
at least to make the effort—as Hegel wished—to read it in a genuinely 
speculative manner.
Hegel announces in the beginning of the Introduction that his ac-
count of the will involves a kind of conceptual unfolding: “The shapes 
which the concept assumes in the course of its actualization are indis-
pensable for the knowledge of the concept itself.”30 And in language that 
recalls the role of the phenomenological observer in the Phenomenology, 
Hegel urges us to “look on at the proper immanent development of the 
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thing itself” (der eigenen immanenten Entwickelung der Sache selbst zu-
zusehen).31 So the Introduction does not offer a logical “proof” that the 
will is free: “The truth is that in philosophical knowledge the necessity 
of a concept is the principal thing; and the process of its production as a 
result is its proof and deduction.”32 Several pages later, Hegel reiterates, 
“Logical deduction . . . this deductive method of the Understanding has 
nothing whatever to do with the satisfaction of the demands of reason 
or with philosophical science.”33
These disclaimers prove to be necessary because moments later, Hegel 
startlingly asserts, without offering any justifi cation: “The will is free.”34 A 
page later, he informs us that the “proof that the will is free” is based on 
premises established in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences.35 
But Hegel provocatively adds that even his most “speculative” formula-
tions are rigorously grounded in concrete experience: “The moments in 
the concept of the will . . . result from the premisses to which I have just 
referred, but in addition anyone may fi nd help towards forming an idea 
of them by calling on his own self-consciousness.”36
He begins his account of the will by asserting, “The will contains 
. . . the element of pure indeterminacy [reinen Unbestimmtheit] or that 
pure refl ection of the ego into itself which involves the dissipation of 
every restriction [Beschränkung] and every content either immediately 
presented by nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, [die Bedürfnisse, 
Begierden und Triebe] or given and determined by any means whatever. 
This is the unrestricted infi nity of absolute abstraction or universality, 
the pure thought of oneself.”37 This capacity of the will to abstract from 
every determination, Hegel is quick to insist, “is only one side of the 
will,” but when this one side is taken for the whole, we have “negative 
freedom, or freedom as the Understanding conceives it.”38 In vivid lan-
guage, he writes that such a capacity of the will “takes shape in religion 
as the Hindu fanaticism of pure contemplation [der Fanatismus der 
indischen reinen Beschauung].”39
This “unrestricted infi nity of absolute abstraction” gives way to what 
Hegel dramatically calls the “absolute moment”: “At the same time, 
the ego is also the transition from undifferentiated indeterminacy to 
the differentiation, determination, and positing of a determinacy as a 
content and object. Now further, this content may either be given by 
nature or engendered by the concept of mind [Geist]. Through this 
positing of itself as something determinate, the ego steps in principle 
into determinate existence. This is the absolute moment, the fi nitude or 
particularization of the ego.”40 This second moment—what he concisely 
calls “determination”—“cancels the abstract negativity of the fi rst” (es 
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ist nämlich das Aufheben der ersten abstrakten Negativität).41 The transla-
tor Knox misleadingly renders Aufheben as cancellation; it is essential, 
however, that Aufheben (the usual rendering in English is “sublation”) 
contain the meanings of both cancellation and preservation, as Hegel 
himself repeatedly insists. The movement from the fi rst to the second 
moment, in fact, seems to be the precise one of determinate negation (a 
concept elaborated in the Introduction to the Phenomenology).42 Hence, 
Hegel adds: “this second moment is already contained in the fi rst and is 
simply an explicit positing of what the fi rst already was implicitly [was 
das erste schon an sich ist].”43
Of course, with Hegel, we can never rest complacent in a second 
moment’s negation of the fi rst; what is ultimately required is the nega-
tion of the negation. Accordingly, in the next paragraph, Hegel declares 
that “freedom of the will” consists in the unity of the fi rst and second 
moments just discussed:
The will is the unity [die Einheit] of both these moments. It is par-
ticularity refl ected into itself and so brought back to universality, 
i.e. it is individuality. It is the self-determination of the ego, which 
means that at one and the same time the ego posits itself as its own 
negative, i.e. as restricted and determinate, and yet remains by itself, 
i.e. in its self-identity and universality. It determines itself and yet at 
the same time binds itself together with itself. The ego determines 
itself in so far as it is the relating of negativity to itself [insofern es die 
Beziehung der Negativität auf sich selbst ist]. As this self-relation, it 
is indifferent to this determinacy; it knows it as something which is 
its own, something which is only ideal, a mere possibility by which 
it is not constrained and in which it is confi ned only because it has 
put itself in it.—This is the freedom of the will and it constitutes the 
concept or substantiality of the will, its weight, so to speak, just as 
weight constitutes the substantiality of a body.44
The trouble with most readings of this crucial formulation is their fail-
ure to conceive this third moment’s “unity” as a negation of the second 
moment’s negation. For instance, Paul Franco, an analytically oriented 
commentator, essentially aligns Hegel’s notion of the will as “the self-
determination of the ego” with Kantian autonomy.45 But this misses the 
crucial difference between Hegelian and Kantian agency: namely, that 
for Hegel, the ego “remains by itself” even as it “posits itself as its own 
negative.” So long as we remain trapped in a Kantian paradigm, Hegel’s 
complex formulation of the will all too easily collapses into the liberal 
ideology of freedom of choice.
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In fact, Hegel seems to have anticipated later liberal appropriations 
of his conception of the will in his trenchant critique of what he calls 
the “arbitrary will.” In the arbitrary will, “the ego . . . is the possibility 
of determining myself to this or to something else, of choosing between 
these specifi c determinations, which at this point I regard as external 
to me.”46 The will is “arbitrary” in this case since the “determinations” 
among which the ego chooses are themselves merely given to the ego, not 
willed by it. Thus, the arbitrary will involves “dependence on a content 
and material given either from within or from without.”47 Put con-
cretely, the “choices” that the arbitrary will is faced with are themselves 
prescribed by some combination of society (“from without”) and the 
ego’s inner impulses and inclinations (“from within”). So, from Hegel’s 
perspective, the prized “freedom of choice” of liberal doctrine proves 
to be an empty freedom.
Hegel insists that the “unity” of the fi rst two moments of the will has 
to be understood in a rigorously “speculative” manner:
The fi rst two moments . . . are readily admitted and grasped because, 
taken independently, they are false and moments of the Understand-
ing [Verstand]. But the third moment, which is true and speculative 
(and everything true must be thought speculatively if it is to be 
comprehended) is the one into which the Understanding declines to 
advance, for it is precisely the concept which it persists in calling the 
inconceivable. It is the task of logic as purely speculative philosophy 
to prove and explain further this innermost secret of speculation, of 
infi nity as negativity relating itself to itself, this ultimate spring of 
all activity, life, and consciousness.48
Though Hegel insists that the Understanding is unable to grasp the third 
moment, the irony of Hegel commentary is that this third moment has 
been grasped exclusively by the Understanding; that is, its speculative 
content has been actively suppressed by such commentators as Wood 
and Pippin. But honoring its “speculative” content proves much more 
diffi cult than it might seem since language itself has a tendency to reduce 
the speculative to the merely discursive: “if you say ‘the will is universal, 
the will determines itself ’, the words you use to describe the will pre-
suppose it to be a subject or substratum from the start. But the will is 
not something complete and universal prior to its determining itself 
and prior to its superseding and idealizing this determination.”49 We 
have to remain attentive to the ways in which the very subject-predicate 
form of philosophical propositions might spuriously substantialize 
the will. As Adorno puts it, “language and the process of reifi cation 
are interlocked.” “The very form of the copula, the ‘is,’” he continues, 
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“pursues the aim of pinpointing its object, an aim to which philosophy 
ought to provide a corrective; in this sense all philosophical language 
is a language in opposition to language, marked with the stigma of its 
own impossibility.”50
Considering the rigors of speculative reading, it is perhaps unsur-
prising that Hegel’s formulation of the free will as “the unity of the two 
moments” has been regularly evacuated of its speculative content and 
reduced to the liberal doctrine of freedom of choice. No commentator 
I have encountered simply takes Hegel at his word and interprets his 
Philosophy of Right conception of the free will in terms of his speculative 
logic. I make an attempt here at such an interpretation. Fortunately, Žižek 
offers a very useful head start. Žižek brilliantly relates Hegel’s doctrine 
of essence (Book II of the Science of Logic) to agency by focusing on the 
three forms of “refl ection” Hegel articulates in that section: positing, 
external, and determining refl ection. Taking Žižek’s lead, I test the pos-
sibility that there is a rigorous homology between the three moments of 
the will, elaborated in the Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, and 
the three forms of refl ection in the Science of Logic.51
The fi rst book of the Science of Logic concerns “being” (Sein), what 
Hegel calls the “immediate.”52 The movement into the subject of Book 
II, “essence” (Wesen), is motivated by the logical need to overcome such 
immediacy: “Being is the immediate. Since knowing has for its goal 
knowledge of the true, knowledge of what being is in and for itself, it 
does not stop at the immediate and its determinations, but penetrates 
it on the supposition that at the back of this being there is something 
else, something other than being itself, that this background constitutes 
the truth of being.”53 So in Book II, Being is reduced to “illusory Being” 
(Schein) since it becomes “the unessential” relative to its underlying 
essence: “Essence that issues from being seems to confront it as an op-
posite; this immediate being is, in the fi rst instance, the unessential.”54 
But the relation between essence and its illusory manifestation in being 
is not a contingent or arbitrary one. As Hegel puts it, “this illusory be-
ing is not something external to or other than essence; on the contrary, 
it is essence’s own illusory being. The showing of its illusory being 
within essence itself is refl ection.”55 “Refl ection” is precisely the process 
of essence’s sublation of illusory being within itself: “Essence contains 
the illusory being within itself as the infi nite immanent movement that 
determines its immediacy as negativity and its negativity as immediacy, 
and is thus the refl ection of itself within itself. Essence in this its self-
movement is refl ection.”56
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In the highly complex section that follows, Hegel argues that there are 
three stages within refl ection itself. Carefully following the intricacies of 
his doctrine of refl ection will prove to be necessary, I think, in order to 
read Hegel’s metaphysics of the will in a speculative manner. In the fi rst 
form of refl ection, positing refl ection, the immediacy of illusory being 
is taken for the essence. It posits its own immediacy: “It is a positing in 
so far as it is immediacy as a returning movement; for there is no other 
on hand, either an other from which or into which immediacy returns.”57 
But it immediately sublates its positing; in other words, it presupposes, 
or takes for granted, its very capacity to posit robustly: “Refl ection in its 
positing, immediately sublates its positing and thus has an immediate 
presupposition. . . . But the fact that what is thus presupposed is a negative 
or is posited does not concern it; this determinateness belongs only to 
the positing refl ection, but in the presupposing the positedness is present 
only as sublated.”58 The crucial point here is that positing refl ection posits 
its very capacity to posit—but since it fails to acknowledge its positing 
of this capacity to posit, such positing is merely presupposed by it.
This is highly abstract, but thankfully, intelligent commentators have 
offered useful paraphrases of positing refl ection. Pippin conceives posit-
ing refl ection as the “impossibility of a purely self-determined refl ective 
condition.”59 I hope we can begin to notice a connection between posit-
ing refl ection and the fi rst moment of the will in the Philosophy of Right. 
In this fi rst moment of the will, the “unrestricted infi nity of absolute 
abstraction,” the will assumes the capacity to abstract from every deter-
mination—in terms of the Science of Logic, it presupposes its capacity to 
posit robustly. What it fails to see is that its very capacity to posit is itself 
posited; in other words, it fails to acknowledge that its assumption of 
radical agential autonomy is precisely an illusion.
Perhaps the underlying mechanism of positing refl ection will become 
clearer once it is contrasted with external refl ection. External refl ection, 
Hegel claims, renders transparent the positedness of the presupposition 
of positing refl ection. External refl ection directly negates positing refl ec-
tion and thus “presupposes itself as sublated, as the negative of itself.”60 
Hegel elaborates that external refl ection “is refl ection that is negatively 
self-related; it is related to itself as to its non-being.”61 Hegel very usefully 
associates external refl ection with Kant’s notion of refl ective judgment. 
For Kant (according to Hegel), judgment is merely refl ective, “if only 
the particular is given for which the universal is to be found.”62 Hegel 
then observes: “That refl ection to which Kant ascribes the search for 
the universal of a given particular is clearly also only external refl ection, 
which is related to the immediate as to something given.”63 For external 
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refl ection, then, the immediate is seen as a mere epiphenomenon of its 
underlying essence: it is wholly “subsumed” under the universal. Thus, 
Hegel writes: “the universal, the principle or rule and law to which it 
advances in its determining, counts as the essence of that immediate 
which forms the starting point; and this immediate therefore counts as a 
nullity, and it is only the return from it.”64 So the supposed superiority 
of external refl ection over positing refl ection is shown to be illusory. 
In fact, external refl ection “presupposes the immediate”: it posits the 
immediate as “something given.” Although it seems as if external refl ec-
tion constitutes an advance over positing refl ection insofar as it “goes 
beyond an immediate to the universal,” external refl ection spuriously 
posits the immediate as given, over against the universal. Pippin helpfully 
defi nes external refl ection as “refl ection simply being determined by the 
. . . empirically given.”65 So if positing refl ection simply presupposed its 
capacity to posit robustly, external refl ection is “external” insofar as it 
presupposes radical determination of the immediate by external forces 
(what Pippin calls the “empirically given”).
But here Hegel makes a crucial observation: “The fact is . . . that ex-
ternal refl ection is not external, but is no less the immanent refl ection 
of immediacy itself.”66 And now we can link external refl ection to the 
second moment of the will in the Philosophy of Right—the “absolute 
moment” of determination. What should not be missed is how the 
second moment of the will is generated out of the fi rst moment: what 
was merely in itself for positing refl ection becomes for itself in external 
refl ection. It is in this precise sense that Hegel argues (as cited earlier) 
that the second moment of the will is simply a radicalization of the fi rst 
moment: “this second moment is already contained in the fi rst and is 
simply an explicit positing of what the fi rst already was implicitly [was 
das erste schon an sich ist].”67 Žižek helpfully elucidates the basic dif-
ference between positing and external refl ection as follows: “to put it 
in Spinozeian terms: ‘positing refl ection’ observes things as they are in 
their eternal essence, sub specie aeternitatis, whereas ‘external refl ection’ 
observes them sub specie durationis, in their dependence on a series of 
contingent external circumstances.”68 In the terms of my introduction 
to this paper, we might say that positing refl ection fi nds its analogue 
in Sartrean absolute “freedom of choice,” and external refl ection in the 
thoroughgoing socio-economic determinism of vulgar Marxism.
Hegel resolves this deadlock between positing and external refl ection 
by introducing “determining refl ection.” But this is where it will prove 
necessary to take issue with both Žižek and Pippin. The trouble with 
Žižek is that he sees determining refl ection as a radically ideological 
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gesture: he discerns “an elementary ideological operation” in the forms 
of determining refl ection.69 In The Sublime Object of Ideology, he elabo-
rates on this notion: “What is the ‘empty gesture’ by means of which the 
brute, senseless reality is assumed, accepted as our own work, if not the 
most elementary ideological operation, the symbolization of the Real, 
its transformation into a meaningful totality, its inscription into the 
big Other?”70 But this impels Žižek to locate genuine freedom outside 
of the circuit of refl ection altogether: he locates “radical change” in 
“the fi nal stage of the psychoanalytic process: ‘subjective destitution.’”71 
Here Žižek’s overeagerness to assimilate Hegel to a Lacanian framework 
becomes overtly problematic. For Hegel clearly sees determining refl ec-
tion as a genuine dialectical resolution of the deadlock between positing 
and external refl ection. Instead of taking the immediate simply as given 
as external refl ection does, determining refl ection posits the immedi-
ate “in accordance with its true being.”72 The transition from external 
to determining refl ection thus consists in the crucial transposition of 
external refl ection into the very workings of immediacy itself: “what 
refl ection does to the immediate, and the determinations which issue 
from refl ection, are not anything external to the immediate but are its 
own proper being.”73
Hegel captures this transposition in a dramatic metaphor near the 
end of the section: determining refl ection “is positedness, negation, which 
however bends back into itself the relation to other, and negation which 
is equal to itself, the unity of itself and its other, and only through this 
is an essentiality.”74 Pippin views Hegel’s resort to metaphor here as an 
index of his failure to articulate the concept of determining refl ection.75 
Pippin concludes, therefore, that “the ‘resolution’ suggested by determin-
ing refl ection is not really a resolution at all.”76 Žižek acutely recognizes 
Pippin’s failure: “Pippin fails at the crucial place, in his treatment of the 
logic of refl ection. The fi nal result of his analysis is that we are ultimately 
condemned to the antinomy of positing and external refl ection: he 
repudiates ‘determining refl ection’ as an empty metaphoric formula, a 
failed attempt to break out of this antinomy.”77 By contrast, as we have 
seen, Žižek does not dismiss determining refl ection as an empty resolu-
tion but sees it rather as the “elementary ideological operation” of the 
subject’s decisive inscription into the “big Other.”
But this is where I must depart from Žižek. The fundamental problem 
with Žižek’s account becomes apparent when we attempt to correlate 
determining refl ection with the third moment of the will in the Philoso-
phy of Right, the moment when the will becomes genuinely free. Just as 
free will is “the unity” of the fi rst two moments of the will, determining 
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refl ection is the “unity of itself and its other”—of positing and external 
refl ection. As Hegel puts it: “In so far . . . as it is the positedness that is 
at the same time refl ection-into-self, the determinateness of refl ection 
is the relation to its otherness within itself.”78 In a concise formulation 
of the same point, he writes: “The determination of refl ection . . . has 
taken its otherness back into itself.”79 It is in this precise sense that we 
can understand Hegel’s account of the third moment of the will as 
“particularity refl ected into itself and so brought back to universality.”80 
So the third moment’s “unity,” in order to be understood in a genuinely 
speculative manner, must be understood in terms of the “unity” of de-
termining refl ection. Conceiving the “unity” of determining refl ection 
in terms of the Understanding would be a radical falsifi cation: “It is not 
an affi rmative, quiescent determinateness, which would be related to 
an other in such a way that the related term and its relation are distinct 
from each other.”81 But now we can see the problem with analytic philo-
sophical appropriations of Hegelian free will to a liberal framework: on 
the “rational project” view, the subject chooses from a host of options 
which are strictly external to it. Such a liberal reading misses the funda-
mental point of determining refl ection’s “taking its otherness back into 
itself”—namely, that the otherness is no longer other.
So the basic problem with Žižek’s account is that this third moment 
of the will—in which the will achieves genuine freedom—is radically 
ideological, is not really “free” at all. This is an unacceptable consequence 
since it is clear from Hegel’s work that true freedom consists precisely 
in “being at home with oneself in one’s other.” For Hegel, the subject’s 
“free” sublation of otherness into itself is the decisively non-ideological 
gesture. Žižek systematically (and no doubt willfully) confuses the 
Hegelian subject’s sublation of its other with the subject’s ideological 
inscription into the “big Other.”
Several years after the publication of the Science of Logic, Hegel 
composed the Encyclopaedia Logic—intended as a supplement to his 
lecture courses—which covers much of the same ground as the earlier 
work in a more accessible fashion.82 The second subdivision of the 
Encyclopaedia Logic revisits the doctrine of essence elaborated in the 
Science of Logic but mercifully offers concrete examples for his abstract 
assertions and even discusses freedom of the will within that context. 
Turning briefl y to the Encyclopaedia Logic might allow us more fully to 
grasp the subtle ways in which Hegel’s theory of refl ection informs his 
metaphysics of the will.
Although the Encylopaedia Logic does not employ the language of 
“refl ection” of the Science of Logic, much of the second subdivision 
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can be seen as an attempt to articulate the fundamental mechanism 
of determining refl ection in a different terminological register.83 Hegel 
argues, “What is outer is, fi rst of all, the same content as what is inner 
. . . appearance does not show anything that is not within essence, and 
there is nothing in essence that is not manifested.”84 He then imme-
diately relates this fundamental insight of determining refl ection to 
agency. Hegel observes that only “the abstract understanding with its 
‘either-or’” insists on an absolute distinction between the individual 
and his “circumstances”: “[W]e can gather what our attitude should be 
when someone appeals to his quite different inner self, and his alleg-
edly excellent intentions and sentiments, in the face of his inadequate 
performances and even of his discreditable acts. There may, of course, 
be single instances where, through the adversity of external circum-
stances, well-meant intentions come to nothing and the execution of 
well-thought out plans is frustrated. But here, too, the essential unity 
of inward and outward generally holds good; and hence it must be said 
that a person is what he does.”85 So what seem to be external impediments 
to an individual’s free will actually prove to be constitutive of free will 
itself. Hegel offers a concrete example of how the subject’s sublation of 
otherness takes place:
Thus a child, for instance, [considered] as human in a general sense, 
is of course a rational essence; but the child’s reason as such is present 
at fi rst only as something inward, i.e., as a disposition or vocation, 
and this, which is merely internal, has for it equally the form of what 
is merely external, namely, the will of its parents, the learning of its 
teachers, and in general the rational world that surrounds it. The 
education and formation of the child consists therefore in the process 
by which it becomes for-itself also what it is initially only in-itself and 
hence for others (the adults). Reason, which is at fi rst present in the 
child only as an inner possibility, is made actual by education, and 
conversely, the child becomes in like manner conscious that the ethics, 
religion, and science which it regarded initially as external authority 
are things that belong to its own and inner nature.86
Notice that the child’s rational essence only emerges through the trans-
position, or sublation, of what seemed strictly external to its essence 
into itself, thus following precisely the logic of determining refl ection, 
according to which the pressure of external refl ection is displaced into 
the workings of immediacy itself.
Soon enough, Hegel explicitly links this process of the sublation of 
otherness to genuine freedom of the will: “The will that is genuinely 
free, and contains freedom of choice sublated within itself, is conscious 
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of its content as something steadfast in and for itself; and at the same 
time it knows the content to be utterly its own.”87 In genuine freedom of 
the will, then, the choice of content is not arbitrary at all—it is utterly 
“steadfast”; yet, that very same content is known to be “utterly its own.” 
What liberal readings of Hegel’s notion of the free will miss is precisely 
this “steadfastness” of the content. Moments later, Hegel offers his most 
trenchant critique of the liberal doctrine of freedom of choice:
[T]he will that does not go beyond the level of freedom of choice, 
even when it decides in favour of what is, as regards its content, true 
and right, remains infected with the conceit that, had it so pleased, 
it could also have decided in favour of something else. For the rest, 
when we look at it more closely, freedom of choice proves to be a 
contradiction, because the form and content are here still opposed 
to one another. The content of freedom of choice is something given, 
and known to be grounded, not within the will itself, but in external 
circumstances. For this reason, freedom in relation to such content 
consists only in the form of choosing; and this formal freedom must 
be regarded as a freedom that is only supposed to be such because 
it will be found, in the fi nal analysis, that the same external sort of 
circumstances in which the content given to the will is grounded must 
also be invoked to explain the fact that the will decides in favour of 
just this and not that.88
Hegel anticipates here the most advanced forms of ideology critique 
available to us today. He begins by pointing out that the liberal notion 
of freedom of choice proves to be an empty freedom since the array of 
choices that the agent is faced with is itself merely given—it is grounded 
in “external circumstances.” But his brilliant next move is to note that 
even the liberal agent’s “freedom” to choose is itself radically unfree 
since its choice is dictated by the very same “external circumstances”: 
“the same external sort of circumstances . . . must also be invoked to 
explain the fact that the will decides in favour of just this and not that.” 
We are now equipped to isolate the deepest problem with the Wood-
Pippin interpretation of Hegelian agency as the subject making certain 
external ends its own by incorporating them into its “rational project.” 
Hegel’s point is that the so-called “rational project” itself is arbitrary, 
and therefore profoundly irrational, to the extent that the subject’s 
very choice of a certain “rational project” is radically determined by its 
culture’s prevailing ideologies.89
By contrast, true freedom is only secured through the recognition of 
absolute necessity: “we can also gather how absurd it is to regard freedom 
and necessity as mutually exclusive. To be sure, necessity as such is not 
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yet freedom; but freedom presupposes necessity and contains it sub-
lated within itself. The ethical person is conscious of the content of his 
action as something necessary . . . it is only through this consciousness 
that his abstract freedom becomes a freedom that is actual and rich in 
content, as distinct from freedom of choice.”90 But this is not a necessity 
imposed from without, but rather one realized from within—a neces-
sity, to use the language of the Science of Logic, that the subject freely 
“bends back into” itself.
V. The Problem of Agency in 
the Phenomenology of Spirit
Hegel’s scattered remarks on agency in his early work, the Phenom-
enology of Spirit, seem almost to invite misinterpretation. Applying the 
metaphysics of the will just elaborated to the Phenomenology might al-
low us both to resist reductive readings of his account of agency and to 
discern important continuities between the early and late Hegel. In the 
Observing Reason section of the Phenomenology, Hegel argues that the 
fundamental problem with observational psychology is that it clings to 
an absolute distinction between the individual and its circumstances: 
“the individuality itself” is pitted against “the given circumstances, situ-
ation, habits, customs, religion, and so on.”91 Consider observational 
psychology in terms of external refl ection. As discussed earlier, exter-
nal refl ection, in subsuming the particular under the universal, ends 
up reducing the particular to an epiphenomenal “nullity.” The basic 
problem with external refl ection is that it presupposes the immediate 
as merely “given.” Notice that observational psychology is guilty of the 
same mistake in rigidly contrasting the “individual” to the “given” cir-
cumstances. Because observational psychology implicitly relies on the 
inadequate metaphysics of external refl ection, it simply cannot honor 
the complexities of the individual’s relation to its circumstances:
Now, the law of this relation of the two sides [according to observa-
tional psychology] would have to state the kind of effect and infl uence 
exerted on the individuality by these specifi c circumstances. But this 
individuality consists precisely both in being the universal, and hence 
directly and unresistingly coalescing with the given universal, the 
customs, habits, etc., and becoming conformed to them; and in set-
ting itself in opposition to them and in fact transforming them; and 
again, in behaving towards them in its individuality with complete 
indifference, neither letting them exert an infl uence on it, nor being 
active against them. Therefore, what is to have an infl uence on the 
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individuality, and what kind of infl uence it is to have—which re-
ally mean the same thing—depend solely on the individuality itself 
[Was auf die Individualität Einfl uss und welchen Einfl uss es haben 
soll—was eigentlich gleichbedeutend ist—, hängt darum nur von der 
Individualität selbst ab]; to say that by such and such an infl uence 
this individuality has become this specifi c individuality means noth-
ing else than that it has been this all along.92
So much seems to depend on what Hegel means when he says “depend 
solely on” (abhängen von) in this passage.93 On a superfi cial reading, it 
seems to suggest that the individual possesses the second-order capacity 
to choose its fi rst-order determinations: it freely chooses how its “circum-
stances” will affect it. But this is precisely the arch-bourgeois conception 
of freedom of choice that Hegel subjects (as we have amply seen) to radi-
cal critique. So long as we remain within this liberalist framework, we 
cannot escape the vicious circle of the individual and its circumstances 
that Hegel so brilliantly exposes in his later work: the supposedly “free” 
second-order choice ends up being radically determined by the very 
circumstances that it claims to stand above.
Instead, let us explore the possibility that Hegel here critiques the 
“external refl ection” metaphysics of observational psychology from the 
precise standpoint of determining refl ection. Later in the paragraph, 
Hegel vividly captures the deadlock between positing and external re-
fl ection (or the fi rst and second moments of the will in the Philosophy 
of Right) in the striking image of a “double gallery of pictures”:
If the constitution which the external world has spontaneously given 
itself is that which is manifest in the individuality, the latter would be 
comprehended from the former. We should have a double gallery of 
pictures, one of which would be the refl ection of the other: the one, 
the gallery of external circumstances which completely determine 
and circumscribe the individual, the other, the same gallery trans-
lated into the form in which those circumstances are present in the 
conscious individual: the former the spherical surface, the latter the 
centre which represents that surface within it.94
[Wir hätten eine gedoppelte Gallerie von Bildern, deren eine der Wider-
schein der andern wäre; die eine die Galerie der völligen Bestimmtheit 
und Umgrenzung äusserer Umstände, die andere dieselbe übersetzt in 
die Weise, wie sie in dem bewussten Wesen sind; jene die Kugelfl äche, 
dieses der Mittelpunkt, welcher sie in sich vorstellt.]95
On the “external refl ection” side of the double gallery, the individual is 
a mere “nullity” subsumed under “external circumstances,” while on the 
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“positing refl ection” side, these circumstances are present only in the 
individual himself. But notice how the double gallery metaphor yields to 
a startlingly different metaphor in the passage’s last clause: “the former 
the spherical surface, the latter the centre which represents that surface 
within it.” The linear, non-hierarchized double gallery literally bends 
back into itself to form a sphere, suddenly transposing the “external re-
fl ection” gallery onto its surface and swallowing the “positing refl ection” 
gallery into its center. But recall that this is precisely how determining 
refl ection resolves the deadlock between positing and external refl ection: 
determining refl ection “bends back into itself the relation to other.”96
The next passage reveals the work to which this “spherical” metaphor 
is put:
But the spherical surface, the world of the individual [die Welt des 
Individuums], has at once an ambiguous meaning: it is the actual 
state of the world as it is in and for itself, and it is the world of the 
individual; it is the latter either in so far as the individual has merely 
coalesced with that world, has let it, just as it is, enter into him, be-
having towards it as a merely formal consciousness; or, on the other 
hand, it is the world of the individual, in the sense that the actual 
world as given has been transformed by the individual [Welt des In-
dividuums so zu sein, wie das Vorhandene von ihm verkehrt worden 
ist]. Since, on account of this freedom [Da um dieser Freiheit], the 
actual world is capable of having this twofold meaning, the world 
of the individual is to be comprehended only from the individual 
himself; and the infl uence on the individual of the actual world, 
conceived as existing in and for itself, receives through the individual 
the absolutely opposite signifi cance, viz. that the individual either 
allows free play to the stream of the actual world fl owing in upon it, 
or else breaks it off and transforms it [dass es entweder dem Strom 
der einfl iessenden Wirklichkeit an ihm gewähren lässt oder dass es ihn 
abbricht und verkehrt].97
The ambiguity in the phrase, “the world of the individual,” lies in the 
genitive “of,” which can be interpreted in opposed ways: on the one 
hand, the “world” can be seen as standing over against the individual, 
and on the other, the “world” can be seen as manifesting itself in the 
individual itself. At this point, Hegel crucially introduces the notion 
of freedom (Freiheit)—at the exact moment that the individual bends 
back into itself its “external” determining circumstances: “Since, on ac-
count of this freedom, the actual world is capable of having this twofold 
meaning, the world of the individual is to be comprehended only from the 
individual himself.” So Hegel’s displacement of the “positing refl ection” 
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gallery into the center of the sphere can be seen as a crucial assertion 
of the primacy of the subject’s free will: freedom lies in the individual’s 
sublation of the world into itself. But as we have seen, this is precisely 
the logic of determining refl ection: “what refl ection does to the im-
mediate, and the determinations which issue from refl ection, are not 
anything external to the immediate but are its own proper being.”98 It is 
in this sense, then, that Hegel defi nes free will in the Philosophy of Right 
as “the self-determination of the ego, which means that at one and the 
same time the ego posits itself as its own negative, i.e. as restricted and 
determinate, and yet remains by itself.”99
It is only from the perspective of determining refl ection, I think, that 
we can make sense of the section’s last paragraph:
Thus there is no question of a being which would be in and for itself 
and was supposed to constitute one aspect, and the universal aspect 
at that, of a law. Individuality is what its world is, the world that is 
its own. Individuality is itself the cycle of its action in which it has 
exhibited itself as an actual world, and as simply and solely the unity 
of the world as given and the world it has made; a unity whose sides 
do not fall apart, as in the conception of psychological law, into a 
world that in itself is already given, and an individuality existing on 
its own account.100
We can now clearly see the fundamental problem shared by both positing 
and external refl ection: namely, that they presuppose that the individual 
and the world are “given” independently of each other. Determining 
refl ection, by contrast, posits an equal sign between the “individual” 
and the “world”: it is, as we recall, “the unity of itself and its other.”101 
Here, accordingly, Hegel defi nes “individuality” as “simply and solely 
the unity of the world as given and the world it has made.” The “sides” 
of this unity “do not fall apart” because the individual resides in the 
spherical center, sublating the “world as given” within it.
Later, in the “spiritual animal kingdom” subsection of the Phenom-
enology, Hegel elaborates on the assertion just cited that “individuality 
is itself the cycle of its action.” Action as such is shown to be the process 
by which the individual sublates the world as given into the world it 
has made:
[A]ction is simply the coming-to-be of Spirit as consciousness. What 
the latter is in itself, it knows therefore from what it actually is. Ac-
cordingly, an individual cannot know what he [really] is until he has 
made himself a reality through action. However, this seems to imply 
that he cannot determine the End of his action until he has carried it 
out; but at the same time, since he is a conscious individual, he must 
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have the action in front of him beforehand as entirely his own, i.e. as 
an End. The individual who is going to act seems, therefore, to fi nd 
himself in a circle in which each moment already presupposes the 
other, and thus he seems unable to fi nd a beginning, because he only 
gets to know his original nature, which must be his End, from the 
deed, while, in order to act, he must have that End beforehand. But 
for that very reason he has to start immediately, and, whatever the 
circumstances, without further scruples about beginning, means, or 
End, proceed to action; for his essence and intrinsic nature is begin-
ning, means, and End, all in one.102
Here Hegel provocatively suggests that the vicious circle between the 
individual and its circumstances (discussed earlier) can be resolved 
through action itself—since action is precisely the “coming-to-be of 
Spirit as consciousness.” He elaborates on the ontological status of ac-
tion later in the paragraph: “What we have, therefore, is a set of given 
circumstances which are in themselves the individual’s own original 
nature; next, the interest which treats them as its own or as its End; and 
fi nally, the union [of these] and the abolition of the antithesis in the 
means [endlich die Verknüpfung und Aufhebung dieses Gegensatzes im 
Mittel].”103 Action as such unites—by sublating (not by “abolishing,” 
as Miller renders Aufhebung)—the antithesis of the individual and its 
circumstances.
In the Morality section of the Phenomenology, Hegel complicates this 
metaphysics of action by importing the structure of the “double gallery 
of pictures” discussed earlier:
Since, in the action as such, the doer attains to a vision of himself in 
objectivity . . . the inner aspect is judged to be an urge to secure his 
own happiness. . . . No action can escape such judgement, for duty 
for duty’s sake, this pure purpose, is an unreality; it becomes a real-
ity in the deed of an individuality, and the action is thereby charged 
with the aspect of particularity. No man is a hero to his valet; not, 
however, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet—is a 
valet, whose dealings are with the man, not as a hero, but as one who 
eats, drinks, and wears clothes, in general, with his individual wants 
and fancies. Thus, for the judging consciousness, there is no action 
in which it could not oppose to the universal aspect of the action, the 
personal aspect of the individuality, and play the part of the moral 
valet towards the agent.104
Here, the earlier dialectic between the individual and its circumstances—
captured perfectly in the double gallery metaphor—is transposed into 
the moral dialectic between action motivated purely by duty (“autono-
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mous” action in the Kantian sense) and action motivated by impulses 
or inclinations (“heteronomous” action in the Kantian sense). Hegel’s 
point is that no action can escape this “moral” double gallery, in which 
it can be seen as autonomous and heteronomous at one and the same 
time. But for Hegel, unlike Kant, this is far from being a problem: in 
fact, he claims that the Kantian ideal of “duty for duty’s sake . . . is an 
unreality.” Hegel simply rejects Kant’s alignment of genuine agential 
autonomy with action based on absolute duty. Instead, as we have seen, 
Hegel locates robust autonomy in the individual’s sublation of heter-
onomy within itself.
In a fascinating passage from the much later Encyclopaedia Logic, 
Hegel polemically attacks “pragmatic historiographers,” who play the 
“moral valet” to the “heroes” of history:
In our modern era, what we call ‘pragmatic historiography’ has of-
ten sinned quite notably with regard to great historical characters 
through this false separation between inward and outward. . . . In-
stead of contenting themselves with simply narrating the great deeds 
that have been accomplished by heroes of world-historical stature, 
and recognising that their inner selves correspond to the content of 
these deeds, the pragmatic historians have considered it a right and 
duty to scent out allegedly secret motives behind what lies open to 
the light of day; and their opinion has been that historical inquiry is 
all the deeper the more it succeeds in removing the halo of the hero 
who has hitherto been celebrated and praised, and degrading him, 
with regard to his origin and his “real” signifi cance, to the level of 
common mediocrity.105
But notice that in this passage, his concern is with the actions of “heroes 
of world-historical stature,” whereas in the Phenomenology passage, 
“hero” seems to be deployed as a metaphor, applying to the action of 
all people. So what seems to be a metaphysics of action tout court in 
the Phenomenology is restricted in the Encyclopaedia Logic to the action 
of such world-historical heroes. Action as such, in fact, generally oper-
ates at “the level of common mediocrity”—which is to say, pragmatic 
historiographers would probably not be wrong to remove the “haloes” 
from those run-of-the-mill types who believe they are acting out of 
noble motives. But this passage from the Encyclopaedia Logic ends 
with a fundamental ambiguity: “[S]ince inward and outward have in 
truth the same content, it must be expressly asserted, against all such 
schoolmasterly cleverness, that if the historical heroes had been only 
concerned with subjective and formal interests, they would not have 
accomplished what they did; and with reference to the unity of inward 
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and outward, it must be recognised that the great men willed what they 
did and did what they willed.”106 The ambiguity lies in the fact that the 
sentence opens with a general metaphysical thesis about the identity of 
“inward and outward,” but then proceeds to assert that such a “unity of 
inward and outward” only really applies to “the great men.” The Hegel 
of the Encyclopaedia Logic would seem to have to revise the statement 
in the Phenomenology by asserting: No man is a hero to his valet, and 
most men are not heroes, period.107
The ambiguities and questions, in fact, multiply as we continue to 
ponder Hegel’s conception of agency. As we have seen, there seems 
to be a deep tension, both in the Phenomenology itself and in Hegel’s 
work as a whole, between his hypervaluation of action qua action as 
inherently autonomous and his repeated suggestions that only “great 
men” are able to act in a genuinely autonomous manner. What, then, 
is the status of Hegel’s bold assertion in the Philosophy of Right that 
“the will is free”? If only world-historical “heroes” are able to actualize 
their free will, Hegel’s conception of agency threatens to collapse into 
the straightforwardly Kantian conception. In other words, the “bite” of 
his Phenomenology polemic against Kantian ethics is in his insistence 
that Kant rarefi es the genuinely “autonomous” act out of existence. But 
it remains far from clear what an “autonomous” act, on Hegel’s own 
conception, concretely involves.108
I began this essay with the intention of comprehending speculatively 
Hegel’s notion of freedom as “being at home with oneself in one’s other.” 
However, it has turned out that much of the paper has been devoted to 
the seemingly preliminary task of showing up the inadequacies of some 
dominant interpretations of Hegelian agency. Perhaps that is as it should 
be. After all, it was Hegel who insisted that negation, so long as it is “deter-
minate,” is already positive, insofar as it necessarily motivates—and even 
in some sense already constitutes—the emergence of a “new form.”109 
This modest exercise in tarrying with the negative will have succeeded if, 
in future attempts to extract a positive account of agency from Hegel’s 
work, we honor the complexities of Hegel’s formulations and resist 
the reductive assimilation of his account to preconceived frameworks. 
Only a careful understanding of the subtle logic of determining refl ec-
tion—merely gestured toward in this piece—can begin to capture the 
intricate dynamics of freedom by which the Hegelian subject “bends 
back into itself” its relation to its Other.
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1. See Slavoj Žižek, The Ticklish Subject (London: Verso, 1999; hereafter TS), 
1–5.
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nent poststructuralist conceptions of agency (often infl ected by Foucault) 
in his The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989; hereafter SO), 
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to honor poststructuralism’s rejection of subject essentialism without 
foreclosing the possibility of agency. In The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford, 
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(New York: Routledge, 1990; hereafter GT), to theorize a positive account 
of agency in terms of “subversive repetition” inevitably fails because it only 
secures subversion by smuggling in the very category of the subject that 
she claims to reject (see especially 145–9). She resorts to metaphor in an 
effort to capture the nature of the genuinely subversive act: “There is only 
a taking up of the tools where they lie, where the very ‘taking up’ is enabled 
by the tool lying there” (GT, 145). The deep problem with this metaphor, 
of course, is that it depends on an agent who does the “taking up”—even 
if this agent is occluded by the grammar of the sentence (“There is only a 
taking up of the tools”). My essay can be seen as an attempt to provide a 
theoretical frame that might enable a very different way out of the impasse 
so brilliantly articulated by Butler.
4. Simon Glynn’s recent essay, “The freedom of the deconstructed postmod-
ern subject,” refl ects the fundamental deadlock characterizing much of the 
contemporary discourse on agency. See Continental Philosophy Review 35 
(2002): 61–76. He acutely argues that the poststructuralist “deconstruction” 
of the subject seems to foreclose the possibility of freedom, but his posi-
tive account of freedom turns out to be a disguised version of the liberal 
bourgeois ideology of “freedom of choice”: “While constraining the range 
of alternative acts by which one can (semantically) meaningfully constitute 
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conscious, or fully human subjects. As with our physical embodiment and 
economic situatedness, we each remain free within the pertinent range of 
constrained or circumscribed possibilities to articulate ourselves in any 
manner whatsoever” (70). Moreover, Glynn unfairly accuses poststructural-
ism tout court of “reducing” subjects “to the cultural systems which are the 
condition of their possibility” (61).
5. Jean-Luc Nancy’s brilliant Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Ja-
son Smith and Steven Miller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002), stands as an important exception. However, Nancy runs into dif-
fi culties in attempting to articulate a positive account of Hegelian freedom 
(probably due to his deep allegiances to poststructuralism). Freedom, for 
Nancy, consists in the self ’s very freedom from determination: “freedom is 
the name for the necessity to be in itself and for itself detached from all fi x-
ity, all determination, from every given, and every property” (67). As will be 
shown in my discussion of Hegel’s doctrine of the will in the Philosophy of 
Right, Nancy’s conception of Hegelian freedom falls short because it turns 
out to be merely a sublated moment in the development of robust agency. 
What Nancy is unable to allow—and what is essential, I think, in under-
standing Hegelian freedom—is Hegel’s notion of “determining refl ection” 
from the Science of Logic. This is discussed later in the article.
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which Michael Sandel has ascribed to John Rawls.” See Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Freedom (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), 164.
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107. In this context, we can see how Hegel might provide an important correc-
tive to Judith Butler’s attempt to theorize agency (discussed in an earlier 
footnote). While Butler’s project depends on resisting the ontologization 
of subjects into reifi ed identity-categories, she ironically smuggles in some-
thing very much like a universal subject constituted by culture in rigid, 
law-like fashion. That is, her Foucauldian theory of the “cultural constitu-
tion” of the subject founders on its inability to admit any variability in the 
way individual subjects are constituted. Hegel’s crucial point is that not all 
subjects are “constituted” by culture in the same way.
108. Put another way, Hegel’s anti-Kantianism proves to be in tension with his 
avowed Spinozism. Spinoza’s Ethics ends by insisting on the sheer diffi culty 
and rarity of attaining genuine freedom (which, for Spinoza, consists in 
liberation from bondage to the affects): “If the way which I have pointed 
out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be 
discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would 
it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great 
labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all 
things excellent are as diffi cult as they are rare.” See Spinoza, On the Im-
provement of the Understanding; The Ethics; Correspondence, trans. R. H. 
M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1977), 270–1. Nancy is very good on Hegel’s 
debt to Spinozean freedom: “If Hegel refers to Spinoza on the subject of 
freedom, it is because he recognizes in Spinoza the thought of the only true 
freedom in the absolute, as distinct from the illusory freedom of men who 
believe themselves masters of their acts because they are unaware of the 
real determinations of these acts. Free will is only a moment and a fi gure 
of freedom: for in it there subsists, and even prevails, the given fi xity of the 
subject as master of its choices” (67).
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